Abstract. In this article I will present and analyze the concept of all-unity of the two most famous Russian philosophers -Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900) and Semyon Frank (1877-1958). As will be argued, the concept of all-unity is part of an old philosophical tradition. At the same time, it is an original idea of the Russian thought of the Silver Age (the end of the 19 th and the fi rst half of the 20 th centuries).
and India. Soloviev intentionally referred to the philosophical and religion tradition. In his fi rst work entitled The mythological process in the ancient paganism (1873) he noticed that the ancient gods were understood as an expression of all-unity (το παν) 3 . In his later papers the Russian thinker used in this context Heraclitus' term έν και παν ("one and all")
, but in A Critique of Abstract Principles he denied these defi nitions and replaced them by the term "nothing". This word does not express any "content" of the Absolute, but indicates its transcendental character. Hence we can fi nd the elements of negative theology in Soloviev At the same time, the transcendent God needs the world in order to express His nature. The fi rst Absolute as a positive potency of being supposes the existence of the empirical world. Soloviev writes that "God is not satisfi ed with the eternal contemplation of ideal essences, (…) but by an act of His will He focuses on each of them (…) and establishes it as an independent being" 9 . "The absolute substance necessarily and eternally divides itself into two poles: one as the principle of absolute unity, affi rmed as such, the principle of liberty towards any form, any manifestation and any being, and the other one as the principle or the productive form of the multiple beings and of the phenomenal forms" 10 . In this way Soloviev describes the second Absolute which is the principle of all things. It is denoted -in contradistinction to "nothing" -by the term "all", because besides the divine element it contains a material one (Plato's materia prima). As a result, God is "nothing" and "all" -"nothing", for the reason that He is not "something particular", and "all", because He cannot be deprived of anything 11 . This defi nition wasn't new, on the contrary, it was well-known in the mystical tradition.
Soloviev describes the fi rst Absolute as the Spirit, whereas he describes the second Absolute as Logos: it is the eternal foundation of the ideas that emerge in time in the shape of the empirical beings as the World Soul (anima mundi) or κόςμος νοητός. Referring to Plato's dialogue Timaeus, Soloviev calls it "the second God".
As we remember, all-unity (materia prima) is a "negative potency" or potentia proxima essendi. This means that all-unity has a tendency towards the actualization of the ideas. Consequently, the second Absolute is in permanent development, in the process of becoming (according to Soloviev the theory of evolution partially explains this process) 12 . "The idea of reality as a creative life, as manifesting its essence creatively, reminds us of German idealism, of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling" 13 and the various theories of emanation. As a result, there is no essential difference between God and the world. In other words, the "essence" of God and world are the same. (…) God himself endows each point of being with the power of self-consciousness -apart from which the whole of manifold reality could not become external to God. (…) The world is consubstantial with God 14 .
The following scheme illustrates the metaphysical conception of Soloviev:
The fi rst Absolute
The second Absolute All-one All-unity Positive potency
Negative potency / potentia proxima essendi "Nothing" ("En Sof") "All" God Materia prima
Soloviev claimed that the two-polar concept of the Absolute allows him to explain the changing of the world without falling into pantheism which identifi es the fi rst Absolute with the second one (God with the world) 15 . Nevertheless, in Frank's opinion Soloviev's philosophy of all-unity is clearly of a pantheistic character 16 , although most correctly it could be described as panentheism.
This position has signifi cant epistemological consequences. Namely, Soloviev accepts the possibility of direct, intuitive cognition of things, because they are rooted in the second Absolute. At the same time he declares that we could not express the fi rst Absolute (God) adequately, for the reason that He "cannot be the subject of any defi nition" 17 . According to Soloviev, the Absolute is both transcendent and immanent. This ambivalence is conditioned ontologically. No doubt, Soloviev's metaphysics is not dualistic sensu stricto. Rather the thinker intended to construct a synthetic system and to connect "the ideal element with the material one, the principle of unity with the radical plurality of essences"
18 . Frank also paid attention to the transcendent and immanent character of the Absolute, but justifi ed his position in another way. I will present Frank's concept in the next section.
FRANK'S POSITION: THE ABSOLUTE AS THE UNKNOWABLE
In his The Philosophical Foundations of Integral Knowledge Soloviev maintained that the two-polar concept of the Absolute is only "the fruit of the discursive character of our thinking" 19 . Hence we can consider his position "rather as a heuristic trick which allows us to know the nature of the Absolute" 20 . However in other works of Soloviev we can read that the distinction between the fi rst and the second Absolute has a cosmological basis as well: the Russian philosopher, like Schelling, stated that the empirical world had fallen away from God. The Universe (unum versum -"the opposite unity" 21 ) is a disorder of all-union's elements. On the one hand, Soloviev tried to reconcile the unchangeable nature of God (the fi rst Absolute) with the development of nature (which is established in the second Absolute). On the other hand, he did not harmonize the static aspect of the Absolute with the dynamic one. It is one of the weakest points of Soloviev's concept of all-unity.
Frank radically transformed Soloviev's doctrine, believing that the Absolute has a totally simple (non-composite) nature. In An object of knowledge we can fi nd the following theses:
The absolute being is not a being-for-other, but being-for-itself. It is the beingfor-itself which precedes the difference of subject and object. It is total unity (…), life which experiences itself. Consequently it is immanent for itself and for us, because we directly participate in it 22 .
Where Soloviev makes a distinction between the fi rst Absolute and the second Absolute, that allows us to show the difference between the divine and the natural element, and precisely characterizes them, Frank claims that "'true unity' (…) is absolute unity or all-unity" 23 (or else "all-one"). The particular qualities of empirical beings are not something ontologically different from the Absolute (substantially or -as Soloviev seems to say -"topologically", as a result of falling away from the primordial unity), but they are only the product of their cognitive identifi cation. A concrete object exists just "for us", but as such it participates in the absolute unity, so it is not subject to any specifi cation.
Nevertheless Frank like Soloviev pays attention to two aspects of the Absolute. Firstly, the Absolute itself is a total unity, an entirety (in Soloviev's thought the fi rst Absolute, or all-one expresses this feature). Secondly, the Absolute in its relation to the world is a plurality and a foundation of the particular attributes, so it could be compared with the second Absolute of Soloviev. As a result, the Absolute is "free" from any things and at the same time embraces all of them.
Yet a comparative analysis points to an important difference between Soloviev's and Frank's positions. Namely, contrary to Soloviev's opinion, Frank's Absolute is a perfect unity. The author of An object of knowledge does not make any ontological (even conventional) distinctions in the Absolute, but he only demonstrates the variation in its cognition. Both allunity ad extra, considered in its relation to the world, and all-unity ad intra -in its relation to the divine sphere -are not two separate polarities, but just the modi of the same absolute reality.
According to Frank, all-unity as such is not subject to the principle of identity which strictly defi nes an object as "this" and "not that". This is the reason that Frank describes all-unity as "a metalogical unity". The Absolute is the base of all predicates, but as such it is a "transdefi nite" being (in this context Frank adds that the same thought was expressed in the Upanishads which represented the transcendent reality as neti-neti -"neither this nor that") 24 . As Frank wrote,
The sphere of "the unity" in essence is above the sphere of categories of identity and difference. Its relation to the domain of knowledge, which is expressed by the system of the defi nitions, is not subject to these categories, but it should be understood in another fundamental way 25 .
The sphere of the Absolute is beyond the logical principle of identity and no defi nition or opposition (A and non-A) expresses it. Frank characterizes the Absolute as coincidentia oppositorum (the coincidence of opposites). The Russian thinker refers to an old philosophical tradition: The Upanishads, Heraclitus, Plato, Neo-Platonism, the medieval mystics, German idealism and especially Nicholas of Cusa
. Let us quote De docta ignorantia:
I give the name "Maximum" to that for which there cannot be anything greater. But fullness (abundantia) befi ts what is one. Thus, oneness -which is also being -coincides with Maximality. But if such oneness is altogether free from all relation and contraction (respectu), obviously nothing is opposed to it, since it is Absolute Maximality. Thus, the Maximum is Absolute One which is all things. And all things are in the Maximum (for it is the Maximum); and since nothing is opposed to it, the Minimum likewise concedes with it, and hence the Maximum is also in all things 27 .
The next name which Nicholas of Cusa applies to the Absolute (under the infl uence of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Eriugena) is nonaliud -"not-other". In his commentary, the Russian philosopher explains that this notion means that the Absolute precedes the distinction between idem and aliud -"this" and "other". In this way Frank, following Cusanus, tries to overcome the dualistic tendency which, for instance, we can fi nd in Soloviev's thought. Frank admits that the Absolute is a totally simple being or -in Nicholas of Cusa's term -the precise Equality (aequalitas praecisa). Although Soloviev made an effort to show the unity and indivisibility of the Absolute, nevertheless his attempt concerned mainly the "fi rst 24 S. L. Frank Absolute". A non-different non-aliud corresponds with Soloviev's Absolute in se, but not with the "Absolute-for-us" which is expressed in the form of empirical beings. No doubt, "the Father of the Russian doctrine of all-unity" (Soloviev) was close to Cusanus' concept according to which "all is in God" (omnia in deo) 28 , but judged his view as "very daring" 29 . Soloviev -as we have mentioned -tried to overcome the radical pantheism characteristic of Nicholas of Cusa, and distinguished all-one from all-unity.
At fi rst Frank did not agree with Soloviev's solution. In An Object of knowledge he motivated his concept of the absolute being from the epistemological perspective, basing it mainly on the analysis of cognition. In this work, he did not refl ect on the origin and the nature of the world. Yet in the latest papers Frank also considered the problem of the existence of evil in the world, putting forward the hypothesis that it is a result of an enigmatic "fi ssure" in the all-unity 30 . In his philosophical notebook, which Frank wrote during the Second World War, we can fi nd some remarks that resemble the two-polar concept of Soloviev:
The fi rst principle as Absolute is beyond the category of "the one" and "the second", "itself" and "its product". The difference between "the fi rst" and "the second" is involved for the fi rst time in the act of creative embodiment. The fi rst principle by its embodiment is differentiated into Creator and creation (…). This difference and origin of diversity from unity is, fi rst of all, the self-manifestation of the One in the plurality of "the world of ideas". (…) Besides the diversity, "dramatization" also becomes: the created activity spreads from the One to the plurality, on the "monads". On the one hand, this activity creates the harmonic entirety, the organism. On the other hand, each element becomes free (creative), which involves the possibility and necessity of collision between them 31 .
The investigations pursued by Frank in the later period of his activity (like Soloviev) gradually proceeded in the direction of theodicy and theology. Frank leaves radical monism and makes a distinction between Creator and creation, although a bit weaker than the one Soloviev made. The concept of God as an Artist creating the world, and the idea of the strict connection between Creator and creation is deeply rooted in the German One of the most important names of the Absolute is "the Unknowable" (Nepostizhimoe). In this context Frank distinguishes "the Unknowable-forus" (which is incomprehensible in the process of cognition because of the limited character of the notions), from "the Unknowable itself" that we'll never know. This distinction leads to several signifi cant consequences. On the one hand, each act of cognition allows us to penetrate the sphere of the Absolute -"The Unknowable". As Frank said, the absolute being is not far for us (…). The reality as such -what is the most known, what surrounds us from all sides: the reality in which we live, move and exist -corresponds to the Unknowable. All that is understandable and comprehensible, all what we can express conceptually -is also rooted in the Unknowable and has sense only in connection with it 32 .
On the other hand, the only way to cognition of the Unknowable is the awareness of the impossibility of its cognition -learned ignorance, docta ignorantia. Although Frank tries -unlike Soloviev -to escape metaphysical dualism, nevertheless he confesses some kind of epistemological dichotomy. Frank -strongly accenting the connection of the empirical, changeable beings with the Absolute -calls his and Soloviev's concept by the term "ideal-realism" 33 . According to this, the ideal element is the foundation of the empirical reality.
INTUITION AS A WAY OF COGNITION OF THE ABSOLUTE
According to Frank, the Absolute as such (or the fi rst Absolute in Soloviev's conception) is unknowable. Nevertheless, it is the very Absolute that enables the cognition of things. How is this possible? Soloviev and Frank (and other Russian philosophers of the Silver Age) claimed that both the subject and the object of cognition are rooted in the all-unity. There is an immanent, ontological relationship between the subject and the object. Several times Frank and Soloviev illustrated their position using the metaphor of a tree (borrowed from Plotinus' Enneads):
The branches of the tree cross and combine in different ways. The branches and leaves touch one another by their external side. This symbolizes external knowledge [i.e., empirical knowledge -T.O.]. But the same branches and leaves are connected by their common trunk and roots which deliver vital juices to them. This is mystical knowledge or faith 34 .
According to the Russian thinkers, we can perceive the object of knowledge in the act of "faith", "mystical intuition" (Soloviev) , "intuition of all-unity" or "intuition of an integral being as such" (Frank) which is an immediate experience of the absolute reality. This means, that
To know -in all spheres of cognition -means (…) to join the empirical data of experience with the all-unity, i.e. to perceive the traces of the system of the all-unity in the sense-data. (…) "To know" something means to fi nd its place in the eternal, all-embracing unity of being 35 .
As Georges Florovsky wrote, "faith" ("intuition") in Russian philosophy has an obvious existential priority; it gives the true assurance of existence (…). Soloviev used the concept of "faith" in a very wide sense, in which it denotes almost the same basic "insight" into existence as the "intuition" of Bergson 36 .
Kant considered only two causes of the "meeting" of the subject and object of cognition:
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible 37 .
Soloviev and Frank proposed the third solution. In their opinion, the intimate relationship between subject and object in the Absolute is the cognition of the process of knowledge. Hence other Russian philosophersFr. Pavel Florensky and Nikolai Losski -called this concept "the philosophy of homoousians" (όμοουσιός).
THE CONCEPTION OF UNIVERSALS IN THE LIGHT OF ALL-UNITY
According to Soloveiv and Frank all-unity is a hierarchic organism. The ideas of genus contain the ideas of species. For example, the idea of "animal" includes the name of the species ("man", "dog"), proper nouns ("John", "Max") etc. Therefore the content of a singular thing is proportional to the content of its genus (and species). If the thing has a bigger extension, the intension of its idea is bigger as well. We should add that in the debate on universals Soloviev and Frank (like most Russian philosophers) shared the position of concrete universals elaborated by Hegel and especially by the British neo-Hegelian idealists -B. Bosanquet and F. H. Bradley. According to this concept, the common in the different things (unus versus alia) is their foundation, the concrete (from concrescere -"grow together") entirety. In Hegel's opinion,
The concrete and true, and all that is true is concrete, is the universality (…). But absolute universality is not to be thought of either as the universality of refl ection, which is a kind of consensus or generality, or, as the abstract universality and self-identity, which is fashioned by the understanding, and keeps aloof from the individual. It is rather the concrete, self-contained, and selfreferring universality, which is the substance, intrinsic genus, or immanent idea of self-consciousness. It is a conception of free will as the universal, transcending its object, passing through and beyond its own specifi c character, and then becoming identical with itself 38 .
Also, Bradley claimed that the "Absolute is, so far, an individual and a system" 39 . In Soloviev's and Frank's case, "concrete entirety" is all-unity containing all beings.
On the other hand, adhering to the traditional scholastic theory of universals, Soloviev wrote that the root of the endless polemics between nominalism and realism is the identifi cation of ideas and notions although they belong to the different types of universals. Namely, the ideas anticipate the empirical beings, so they are universalia ante res ("before things", according to realism). At the same time, the ideas are expressed by the general notions. Because the general notions do not exist independently, they are universalia post res ("after things", in the terminology of nominalism) 40 . Obviously, all-unity contains both all the ideas and the notions proper to them as well. Hence, from the realistic point of view all-unity is the supreme idea (Plato's idea of Good), whereas from the nominalistic position it is the foundation of being and notions. Frank agreed that universals considered as ideas are "before things" (ante res), and realized that in time they are "in things" (in rebus) 41 . As a result, Russian thinkers tried to bring together realism and nominalism.
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CONCEPT OF ALL-UNITY
The concept of an all-embracing universe proposed by the Russian philosophers and other idealists has some problems. Let us remember Russell's criticisms of the Hegelian philosophy:
The view of Hegel, and of many other philosophers, is that the character of any portion of the universe is so profoundly affected by its relations to the other parts and to the whole, that no true statement can be made about any part except to assign its place in the whole. Since its place in the whole depends upon all the other parts, a true statement about its place in the whole will at the same time assign the place of every other part in the whole. Thus there can be only one true statement; there is no truth except the whole truth 42 
.
Russell opposed the tenets of the Russian philosophers by stating that in order to know the individual thing (i.e. its quality) there is no need to know its relation to the whole. James also combated the holistic concept of cognition: "I left off by asserting my own belief that a pluralistic and incompletely integrated universe, describable only by the free use of the word 'some', is a legitimate hypothesis" 43 . Moreover, the rooting of the empirical world in the Absolute leads to the disappearance of the border between the natural and the supernatural order. The ontological consequence of this situation is panentheism. In its epistemological aspect this means the identifi cation of the cognition of the world with the cognition of God. This opinion was also shared by
